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Synesthesia is an unusual condition occur-
ring in at least 4% of the population
(Simner et al., 2006) in which certain
stimuli trigger unusual perceptions which
the physical properties of the stimulus
alone are not sufficient to account for.
For instance, in grapheme-color synesthe-
sia, the sight of black-and-white printed
letters or numbers triggers the experience
of consistent and specific colors (e.g., A
might be red, 7 yellow: Smilek et al.,
2001). The associations reported by any
given synesthete tend to be remarkably
consistent over time (e.g., Simner et al.,
2005). Hence if A is red for a certain
synesthete, it will tend to always be red.
There is evidence for a genetic compo-
nent to the condition (Ward and Simner,
2005; Asher et al., 2009; Tomson et al.,
2011), and evidence too that the brains of
synesthetes are structurally and function-
ally different to those of non-synesthetes.
For example, in a sound-color and sound-
taste synesthete, Hänggi et al. (2008) found
altered patters of brain volume and func-
tional anisotrophy (FA) values (indicative
of greater white matter coherence). These
included increased FA values in primary
auditory cortex, as well as increased gray
and white matter volumes in the same
region, and also structural differences in
gray and white matter in visual and gus-
tatory regions, i.e., increases in occipital
regions, and increases and decreases in
insular cortex (for review see Hubbard,
2012; Rouw, 2012).
It has often been suggested than synes-
thesia may reveal something about normal
cognition (e.g., Cohen Kadosh and Henik,
2007; Wilson, 2012). Ramachandran and
Hubbard (2001) have even suggested that
the origins of human language may lie in
synesthetic-like correspondences between
speech sounds and the physical proper-
ties of objects they refer to (see Cuskley
and Kirby, 2013 for review). These theories
usually describe synesthesia as a “blend-
ing of the senses,” in which an expe-
rience in one sensory modality triggers
an experience in another sensory modal-
ity; for example sounds triggering col-
ors. However, synesthesia is not always,
or even usually, cross-sensory: the most
common variants are in fact triggered by
language (e.g., colors from graphemes or
words; Simner et al., 2006). In such cases,
the trigger is a cognitive (linguistic) con-
struct rather than sensory percept (for
related discussions see Simner, 2007 and
Mroczko-Wa¸sowicz and Nikolic´, 2014).
Indeed, many types of synesthesia involve
conceptual elements—often linguistic—
and we will argue that these variants
may reveal information about the interface
between perception and cognition.
One example of how synesthesia can
link cognition and perception comes in the
variant known as lexical-gustatory synes-
thesia. In this, tastes are experienced in the
mouth when synesthetes hear, speak, read,
or think about words (Ward and Simner,
2003). Simner and Ward (2006) showed
that these sensations are tied to word
lemmas, the abstract semantic/syntactic
memory traces of words that are distinct
from purely visual and acoustic informa-
tion about the word-form. Given this, we
might conclude that the perceptual taste
sensations of these synesthetes appear to
be triggered by truly abstract cognitive
thought, as a case of direct interaction
between cognition and perception. Our
proposal here begins with the suggestion
(also made by others, see below) that these
kinds of interactions may occur in all peo-
ple, and that synesthetes may simply differ
primarily in their conscious awareness of
them.
Our proposal focusses particularly on
theories of embodied cognition. These
theories contend that conceptual thought
and language are ‘embodied’ or ‘grounded’
in neural systems for perception and
action (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002;
Fischer and Zwaan, 2008). Hence, hear-
ing a word or thinking about a con-
cept would trigger a “simulation” of
stored perceptual or motor information
(Barsalou, 2003; Glenberg and Gallese,
2012). The taste of lemon, for instance,
would form part of the semantics of the
word “lemon,” and the implicit mental
activation of that taste would be linked to
its phonological representation. Whereas
in most people these perceptual connec-
tions are implicit, our hypothesis, first
suggested by Simner and Ward (2006),
is that in lexical-gustatory synesthetes for
example, these same simulations somehow
attain conscious awareness, so that hear-
ing the word “lemon” actually evokes the
taste.
We suggest therefore that normal
“embodied” links between perceptions
(taste of lemon) and words (“lemon”)
may somehow be consciously experi-
enced by synesthetes, due to some type of
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disinhibited or over-exuberant activation
which is normally subdued in the average
person. Of course, this proposal would
only initially account for words that have
an inherent taste, color, or the like (e.g.,
“lemon”). The problem however is that for
many synesthetes, almost all words (e.g.,
“man,” “house,” “reach,” “and”) induce
tastes, often without any obvious connec-
tion to their meaning at all (e.g., “reach”
might taste of fruit sweets). How might
this be explained and how could such
widespread tastes link back to the idea of
embodiment? Importantly, Simner and
Haywood (2009) have shown that, in
the case of lexical-gustatory synesthesia,
the first words to acquire tastes in child-
hood synesthesia are very likely to have
been food words, which acquire tastes in a
semantically-direct way—so “apple” tastes
of apple, “peach” tastes of peach (see also
Ward et al., 2005). Simner and Haywood
suggest that these tastes, or variants
thereof, then spread outwards to phono-
logically similar words that do not have
tastes of their own (e.g., “beach” tastes
of peach; “reach” tastes of peach-flavored
fruit sweets; Simner and Haywood, 2009).
Put differently, synesthetic tastes appear to
spread throughout the lexicon along the
same connections that facilitate phono-
logical priming effects: hearing “beach”
might activate the word “peach,” and
thereby acquire the taste of peach. The
more often this word is heard and the taste
experienced, the more strongly the two
would become connected, so that before
long, synesthetes will differ from non-
synesthetes in not only having conscious
tastes for food words, but also in hav-
ing tastes for other words in their mental
lexicon too1.
1Our account best fits variants of synaesthesia which,
like embodiment, are influenced by word meanings
(e.g., lexical-gustatory synaesthesia). Other variants
such as grapheme-color synaesthesia may be less rele-
vant to our model because colors are driven by sublex-
ical letter units: since letters have no semantic content
they cannot obviously show embodiment effects—at
least not on the surface. Nonetheless, embodiment
might yet hold sway even in these variants. For exam-
ple, in grapheme-color synaesthesia, words become
colored by their initial letter (e.g., “orate” would be
white if the letter “o” is white) but some words such
as color-terms are semantically colored (“orange” is
often colored orange). This follows our hypothesis,
and suggests that embodiment might interact with
other mechanisms even in variants of synaesthesia
that would seem otherwise unsusceptible to its influ-
ences.
One little-known phenomenon that
provides additional evidence for a link
between synesthesia and embodied cogni-
tion is vision-touch synesthesia (Blakemore
et al., 2005), in which people report a
physical sensation of being touched them-
selves when they observe others being
touched. It has also been called mirror-
touch synesthesia by analogy with the “mir-
ror neurons” found initially in the monkey
premotor cortex, and hypothesized to exist
also in humans. These fire both when per-
forming a certain action and when seeing
that action performed (see Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004, for a review). “Mirror-
touch” is a particularly illuminating exam-
ple of synesthesia, because the underlying
connectivity implicated—the mirror neu-
ron system—is not something assumed
to be peculiar to these synesthetes, but
is hypothesized to play a key role in
the imitation, prediction, and understand-
ing of others’ behavior in the general
population (e.g., Wilson and Knoblich,
2005). The embodied simulation theory
of social cognition, for example, pro-
poses that the mirror system, by internally
“simulating” the motor and somatosen-
sory states of conspecifics, allows us to
understand them (Gallese and Sinigaglia,
2011). Indeed, mirror-touch synesthetes
have been found to have greater empa-
thy than controls, which has been inter-
preted as evidence that mirror neurons
may indeed play such a role (Banissy
and Ward, 2007). Banissy and colleagues
have therefore argued that the normally
implicit somatosensory stimulation trig-
gered by observing others might be experi-
enced in an extreme form in mirror-touch
synesthetes2. This view is highly compat-
ible with our own, which also raises a
parallel case for other forms of synesthesia
(see also Simner and Ward, 2006).
So far, we have argued that the connec-
tions between perception and cognition
seen in synesthesia might be present in all
people, but inhibited in the general popu-
lation, consistent with embodied theories
2A link between synaesthesia and the mirror neu-
ron system has also been made in a different way
by Mroczko-Wa¸sowicz and Werning (2012). They
describe cases of synaesthesia where colors are expe-
rienced both from movement and from observ-
ing/imagining the movement of others. They link
this to mirror systems as a way to best model the
inducer, and they also discuss this with reference to
sensori-motor contingencies (see also Seth, 2014).
of language and cognition. However, these
theories are in fact best-known as they
apply to action: i.e., that action concepts
(and the semantics of action words) are
also embodied, this time in the motor sys-
tem. This widespread view of embodiment
suggests that perceiving and understand-
ing action words (e.g., “hit”) or indeed
observing the actions of others, involves
mentally simulating them. So if synesthe-
sia is the result of disinhibited simulation
in the sensory system, what would be the
result of disinhibition of embodied simu-
lation in the motor system? (Our hypothe-
sis thus far certainly predicts there might
be such a phenomenon.) In response
we point to candidates from the range
of behaviors known as “motor release
phenomena.”
Motor release phenomena are a variety
of syndromes involving automatic motor
behaviors, most commonly seen follow-
ing damage to the frontal lobes from
stroke, but also observed in other pop-
ulations with known or suspected dys-
function of frontal control systems. These
include patients with various psychiatric
illnesses and children with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (Archibald et al.,
2001). They can be broadly classified into
three types (Lhermitte, 1983): disinhibition
of basic reflexes such as manual groping,
when the patient’s outstretched hand will
follow an object being moved; imitation
behavior, in which patients automatically
and unwillingly find themselves copying
observed actions; and utilization behav-
ior, where patients compulsively pick up
objects placed in their view, and either
toy with them or use them for their
intended purpose. These behaviors are
perhaps most striking when they only
affect one side of the body, such that one
arm appears to act independently of its
owner’s will, known as the famous “alien
hand sign” or “anarchic hand syndrome”
(e.g., Goldberg and Bloom, 1990).
All these phenomena are thought to
arise from the disinhibition of circuits
which link perceptual input to motor out-
put, possibly through the mirror neuron
system (Berthier et al., 2006; McBride
et al., 2013). Evidence from masked prim-
ing tasks supports the view that these
links are automatically and unconsciously
inhibited in healthy people (e.g., McBride
et al., 2013). Crucially for theories of
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embodied cognition, there is evidence that
this perception-action link is conceptu-
ally or linguistically mediated. Goldberg
and Bloom (1990) reported several cases
of alien hand sign where the alien hand
performed actions that were merely men-
tioned by the investigator. Schaefer et al.
(2013), too, report a patient who would
pick up objects with her alien hand when
told to by the experimenter, but was
unable to do so of her own volition.
Furthermore, some patients could exer-
cise some control over their alien hand
by “talking to it”: when their alien hand
gripped an object, they were able to get
it to release by telling it to “let go.” These
observations fit well with the predictions
of embodied cognition: if understanding
sentences that refer to actions involves
their simulation by the motor system,
then disinhibition of these simulations
would indeed lead to the actions described
being overtly performed (McBride et al.,
2013).
As noted above, theories of embod-
ied cognition propose that the brain’s sys-
tems for perception and action are used
in cognition. We have suggested that both
types of simulation can be disinhibited in
some people, resulting in synesthesia in
the case of the sensory system (see also
Simner and Ward, 2006), and release phe-
nomena in the case of the motor system
(see also McBride et al., 2013). The ques-
tion might be asked why the two types
of disinhibition are not more analogous:
why, for instance, do we not see cases
of synesthesia often arising as a result
of stroke? Our first answer is that the
types of inhibition involved are somewhat
different. In the case of motor embodi-
ment, it is suggested that a motor plan
is initiated, but not executed. In sensory
embodiment, on the other hand, percep-
tual information is activated, but does
not, in most people, reach conscious per-
ceptual awareness. These two forms of
“inhibition” are doubtlessly underpinned
by very different mechanisms. Secondly,
there are in fact cases of synesthesia-like
experiences occurring in non-synesthetes
following brain damage (e.g., Ro et al.,
2007; Brogaard et al., 2013). There are
also cases where it emerged after the
patient became blind late in life (Armel
and Ramachandran, 1999), or under
the influence of hallucinogens (see Luke
and Terhune, 2013, for review), or after
long experience with meditation (Walsh,
2005). They have even been experimen-
tally induced by post-hypnotic suggestion
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). While there
is disagreement as to the extent to which
developmental, acquired, and other forms
of synesthesia might share commonmech-
anisms (Sinke et al., 2012, but cf. Brogaard,
2013), these examples nonetheless sup-
port the hypothesis that the cognition-
perception links seen in synesthesia may
exist in some inhibited form in all peo-
ple, and may become “released” following
trauma, disease or unusual environmental
interactions.
In summary, motor release phenom-
ena have been interpreted as evidence that
the motor system is involved when observ-
ing and describing actions, and in object
affordances (e.g., McBride et al., 2013). We
have proposed that, similarly, some types
of synesthesia suggest that the sensory sys-
tem, too, may play a role in language
and conceptual thought.We have therefore
proposed a relationship between synesthe-
sia and release phenomena, in that each
may be considered in terms of disinhibited
embodiment in sensory and motor sys-
tems respectively. Overall, our arguments
suggest that synesthesia may represent
a case par excellence of the cognition-
perception interface, showing an outward
perceptual manifestation of implicit asso-
ciations that lie at the heart of embodied
cognition.
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